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Social networking sites are increasingly subject to malicious activities such as self-propagating worms, confidence scams and
drive-by-download malware. The high number of users associated with the presence of sensitive data, such as personal or pro-
fessional information, is certainly an unprecedented opportunity for attackers. These attackers are moving away from previous
platforms of attack, such as emails, towards social networking websites. In this paper, we present a full stack methodology for the
identification of campaigns of malicious profiles on social networking sites, composed of maliciousness classification, campaign
discovery and attack profiling. The methodology named REPLOT, for REtrieving Profile Links On Twitter, contains three major
phases. First, profiles are analysed to determine whether they are more likely to be malicious or benign. Second, connections be-
tween suspected malicious profiles are retreived using a late data fusion approach consisting of temporal and authorship analysis
based models to discover campaigns. Third, the analysis of the discovered campaigns is performed to understand the attacks. In
this paper, we apply this methodology to a real world dataset, with a view to understanding the links between malicious profiles,
their attack methods and their connections. Our analysis identifies a cluster of linked profiles focusing on propagating malicious
links, as well as profiling two other major clusters of attacking campaigns.
Keywords: Online social networks, Suspicious profiles, Clustering, Malicious campaigns, Authorship attribution, Twitter
Introduction
The success of online social networks has lead to
important challenges in the context of security. The
survey provided in [10] regroups the security issues
into the following four groups: privacy breaches, vi-
ral marketing, network structural attacks, and malware
attacks. In this paper, we focus on the detection of
malicious content propagation (viral marketing) issued
from a set of profiles that combines their effort (net-
work structural attacks). The large number of users and
the characteristics of the online social networks (e.g.
small world properties) make them particularly vul-
nerable to malicious content propagation. Often per-
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2formed in the form of URLs contained in messages,
malicious attacks can lead to a very large number of
people being infected in a very short period of time.
The Koobface worm has proved the real-life feasibil-
ity, on a very large scale, of malicious content propaga-
tion on online social networks [4]. From simple use of
a profile for performing attacks, malicious actors have
now moved on to a more collective and synchronised
way of undertaking actions. This allows them to in-
crease the impact of their attack by increasing artifi-
cially their reputation and by the same way the total
number of targeted profiles. As a result, the detection
of malicious profiles is often insufficient to eradicate
malicious campaigns and a characterization of them is
required.
One of the key measures to improving defences is
to analyse and understand how these attacks occur and
how they organise. Gathering intelligence on attacks
allows for the creation of short term fixes, such as
new signatures, and long term preventions, such as al-
terations to the policies of the organisation or system
properties. As an example, a campaign spreading ma-
licious links with random verses from a given book. A
short term signature for this attack would be the de-
tection of verses from the book. A longer term solu-
tion would be for the website to analyse the links to see
if there is any correlation between the post and linked
content.
The analysis of malicious campaigns can be a time
consuming process, especially for attacks that obfus-
cate their actions. For this reason, techniques and
methodologies that can automate parts of this process
are needed for social media companies, security com-
panies and law enforcement. Automation allows for
both the breadth and depth of an analysis to be in-
creased, without increasing the burden on analysts. The
main contribution of this paper is therefore a method-
ology for discovering social media campaigns and pro-
viding intelligence in an automated method. This al-
lows for an analyst to perform analysis on an entire
campaign, rather than individual malicious profiles.
In this paper, we present a full stack methodology
for the discovery of malicious campaigns on social net-
working websites. The methodology named REPLOT,
for REtrieving Profile Links On Twitter, contains three
major phases. First, individual profiles are analysed to
determine whether they are malicious or benign. These
profiles are analysed using a set of behavioural fea-
tures and a supervised machine learning algorithm is
then used to classify them as malicious or benign. Sec-
ond, connections between suspected malicious profiles
using a late data fusion approach consisting of tem-
poral and authorship analysis based models. The tem-
poral feature examines the correlation between posts
using an entity based temporal similarity metric. The
authorship analysis technique uses character n-grams
to model authorship, linking disjoint profiles if they
are likely to share a common author. Third, clustering
is used to profile the different malicious campaigns.
Clustering is performed by creating a graph based on
the metrics analysed in phase two, with a view to find-
ing sections of the graph with a high internal similarity.
By using this methodology, malicious profiles are
not only discovered automatically, but also profiled.
For an analyst needing to discover trends and patterns
in attacking profiles, this level of automation reducing
the number of profiles needing to be visited. Rather
than analysing a very large number of individual pro-
files, a smaller number of clusters can instead be anal-
ysed.
We apply this methodology to a real world dataset,
with a view to understanding the links between mali-
cious profiles, their attack methods and their connec-
tions. Our analysis identifies a cluster of linked pro-
files focusing on propagating malicious links, as well
as profiling two other major clusters of attacking cam-
paigns. Our contributions are therefore twofold; first,
we present a methodology consistent in approach for
the detection and analysis of malicious profiles and
second, we present the analysis of malicious profiles
discovered on a social networking website.
State of the Art
Two main approaches can be used to address the
problem of malicious action detection on online social
networks: first, approaches that directly detect poten-
tial sources of malicious actions (i.e. messages or pro-
files); second, approaches that detect communities of
malicious profiles. This section provides an overview
of the state of the art of these two categories of ap-
proaches.
Malicious profile detection
The detection of malicious profiles or messages is
often treated as a classification problem. Such ap-
proaches can be seen as an extension of traditional e-
mail spam detection adapted to the characteristics of
online social networks [9]. These techniques usually
consider the existence of two classes of messages or
3profiles: legitimate and spam. In some works, the level
of danger of spam is also measured and is referred to
as malicious.
We have presented a method for detecting malicious
profiles on the Twitter platform in [22]. This approach,
called SPOT (for Scoring Suspicious Profiles On Twit-
ter), performs in two phases: first, suspicious profiles
are detected based on content-based, graph-based and
behaviour-based generated features; second, messages
published by suspicious profiles are investigated to de-
tect malicious URLs. Note that this work is a current
extension of SPOT that integrates the similarity be-
tween suspicious profiles for characterizing suspicious
social campaigns. The proposed methodology in the
present paper can allow to bypass the scale limitation
of SPOT which can arise when one consider the high
number of candidate profiles to analyse. Indeed, at any
time a profile that can be detected as suspicious by
SPOT can be integrated to our methodology in order to
identify whether it belongs or not to a malicious cam-
paign set.
A method for identifying spam on Twitter is pro-
posed in [27]. In the frame of this research, a set of
behavioural and graph-based features extracted from
the Twitter platform was generated. A Bayesian clas-
sifier is applied to the generated feature for identifying
spammers on Twitter. One limitation of this approach
is undoubtably the large amount of data to handle. In
this particular case, the rapid increasing of malicious
actions can not be addressed in an exhaustive manner.
[24] have proposed a methodology for identifying
spam on social networking sites. The methodology is
based on a set of ’honey-profiles’ that aim to raise the
attention of malicious users. The data collected from
the honey-profiles are used to perform spam detection.
The features considered for the classification of a pro-
file are the number of friends, the number of messages,
the URL ratio, etc. The classification is performed us-
ing a random forest algorithm.
[2] has proposed to classify messages in the three
following classes: legitimate, spam and malicious. The
application of the approach is made on Facebook and
remains on a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifi-
cation. In [18], the authors have handled the problem
of collective attention spam. This problem refers to the
possible use of a trending topic inside messages to ar-
tificially increase their visibility. A decision tree based
random forests is proposed for addressing the problem.
The set of features contains the number of hashtags,
the number of URLs, a bag of words, etc.
It is important to note that, methodologies applied
for detecting malicious profiles can hardly address the
large amount of data daily generated on social net-
working sites. Such approaches require the analysis of
any profile while only a few represent a potential dan-
ger on the platform. To cover this problem, a priority
must be fixed and a possible solution is to focus on
the detection of networks of malicious profiles. These
networks must be treated in priority since their action
have a potential very high impact on users.
Social campaign detection
We present below some approaches that aim to de-
tect connections between malicious profiles such as
spam campaigns on online social networks. In the re-
mainder of this section, we refer to suspicious cam-
paigns as a set of suspicious profiles that perform simi-
lar actions and act in coordination. When the profiles of
such campaigns propagate malicious URLs, the cam-
paign will be referred as malicious.
[24] retrieves connections between malicious pro-
files on the basis of their published URLs. The assump-
tion is that two profiles that publish messages contain-
ing the same malicious URL belong to the same ma-
licious campaign. Note that the use of URL shorten-
ing services can complicate this task, as can dynamic
URLs with randomised components.
Some approaches use a clustering-based algorithm
for identifying communities of normal and spam pro-
files. As an example, [3] has proposed to apply a clus-
tering algorithm on a large set of behavioural and
content-based features. The results show that the ap-
proach can enable spam profiles to be identified with
good accuracy. However, this approach does not enable
the identification of tighter connections between spam
profiles (i.e. spam campaigns).
[6] has introduced the concept of Socialbot Net-
works (SbN), a set of profiles that are owned and main-
tained by a unique human controller. Authors have
proved the efficiency of such networks and have also
highlighted that connecting bots together can artifi-
cially increase the attractiveness of a given malicious
profile.
[11,12] have investigated the relationships exist-
ing between malicious profiles on online social net-
works. They have analysed the link-farming problem
that refers to the creation of illegitimate connections
to increase the visibility of profiles artificially. Their
results have proved that not only do spammers gen-
erate link farming but also that many legitimate pro-
files (with high reputation) accept and generate non-
legitimate connections to increase their audience. Such
4observation highlights the potential difficulty of dis-
tinguishing malicious campaigns from legitimate ones
while using the social graph of a platform.
[28] proposes a solution to identify worm propaga-
tion inside an online social network. The authors pro-
pose to create a decoy network of profiles and analyse
the content received by these profiles. The detection
rests on a local and network level using similarity mea-
sures between messages in order to determine whether
there is evidence of propagation.
In [29], the authors have proposed an approach
to detect promotion and spam campaigns on Twitter.
Their approach is based on a URL-based similarity
measure between two accounts. From this measure,
they build a similarity graph from which sub-graphs
are identified as campaigns. A classification of cam-
paigns is performed by applying a support vector ma-
chine classification on campaign-based features.
A further method of linking profiles can be gained
through analysis of the content, aiming to link profiles
that share content generated by the same author. This
is a problem in the field of authorship analysis, which
aims to identify salient features within written docu-
ments that are hard to obfuscate. Authorship analysis
techniques can be broadly categorised into two cate-
gories: vector space methods [30] and local profiles-
based approaches [13].
Vector space methods take a set of documents and
a set of features describing them, such as average sen-
tence length or the frequency of a specific word. A ma-
trix X is then generated such that Xi, j is the value of
feature j for document i. This feature matrix is then
used as input into a standard machine learning algo-
rithm, such as support vector machines [21].
Local profile methods commonly employ character
n-grams as features, extracting the most descriptive n-
grams from each author. An author is then profiled us-
ing the L most descriptive n-grams in their writing [13].
Documents of unknown authorship are profiled in the
same way. These profiles are then compared to the au-
thor profiles using a distance (pseudo) metric, and the
nearest is predicted as the likely author of the docu-
ment. In their work on the Common N-Grams (CNG)
model, [13] use the following equation to compare pro-
files P1 and P2, where Pi(x) is the frequency of n-gram
x in profile Pi:
K(P1,P2) = å
x∈XP1∪XP2
(
2 · (P1(x)−P2(x))
P1(x)+P2(x)
)2
(1)
Recent research has shown that this approach ap-
pears to have better results in a wide variety of contexts
[8], and more recently in online social media [14,15],
despite the short content lengths. In addition, character
n-grams are language independent and can be applied
to other contexts, including malware detection.
Methodology
The proposed framework rests on a combination
of behavioural and content-based analysis of Twitter
profiles. The behavioural analysis mainly involves the
SPOT tool and the content-based analysis is ensured
by the NUANCE methodology [22,16]. Figure 1 gives
a global overview of the proposed approach.
The first step (referred as step I in figure 1) aims to
identify the suspicious users. For this purpose, a har-
vester module is connected to the online social network
(i.e. Twitter). The module collects and stores the activ-
ities produced by Twitter profiles in a local database.
A profile detection algorithm is performed and the se-
lected profiles are represented by a set of behavioural
features. A classification is performed to identify the
suspicious and normal profiles.
The second step (referred as step II in figure 1) aims
to identify important relationships between suspicious
profiles. This work is performed using a content-based
similarity measure. This similarity combines an au-
thorship attribution method with an entity-based tem-
poral measure.
Finally, a clustering algorithm is performed for high-
lighting campaigns (referred as step III in figure 1).
The detected campaigns are characterised to evaluate
their particularities (size, dynamic, etc.) and their level
of danger.
This section provides explanation on these three key
steps of our methodology.
Suspicious profile detection
The first step of our approach involves near real-time
detection of suspicious profiles. The main objective of
this step is to determine the class of a profile (i.e. suspi-
cious or not). Two main constraints for this step exist:
(1) the number of profiles treated and (2) the rapidity
of the analysis. The number of users makes it impos-
sible to propose an exhaustive approach. Thus, a pri-
ority strategy must be proposed. It is also obvious that
one cannot perform content-based analysis in this step
since the quantity of tweets to analyse is too large. We
propose to define priority proportionally to the number
of messages that appears in the public timeline of Twit-
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Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed approach
ter for a given profile. The timeline of Twitter consists
of a real-time random sampling of the tweets that are
received on the platform. Logically, a profile that sends
a very large number of messages increases its proba-
bility of being published in the timeline.
In this work, we focus on such active profiles be-
cause they are the most visible on the platform and thus
may raise the largest audience when performing an at-
tack. Note however that, once the malicious clusters
are highlighted, it could be possible to test any profile
and determine whether or not it belongs to one of these
campaigns. We perform this step by connecting to the
public timeline via the Twitter stream API and storing
the received messages in a local database. A threshold
K is set to determine whether a given profile p needs
to be analysed. The classification of suspicious profiles
is based on the SPOT 1.0 tool that performs a support
vector machine algorithm on the set of behavioural fea-
tures; the number of followers and friends, the repu-
tation [26], the tweet frequency, the average number
of URLs, hashtags, references in tweets, the rate of
forwarded tweets (aka retweet) and the average of the
Levenshtein distance applied between each couple of
tweets of a profile.
Retrieving connections between suspicious profiles
The second step of the proposed approach concerns
the investigation of the suspicious profiles obtained. A
content-based analysis identifies connections between
profiles. First, an authorship attribution algorithm is
performed on the collected tweets of the suspicious
profiles [15,14]. Then, a temporal similarity is mea-
sured on the entities contained in the messages. Both
analyses contribute to the measure of the similarity of
profiles in a late data fusion approach, where the results
are combined after the models are applied.
The authorship analysis was performed using a
trimmed version of the NUANCE algorithm [16],
which was originally used in [14]. In the normal NU-
ANCE algorithm, an ensemble is used to cluster doc-
uments by authorship. While it has been shown to be
effective, the algorithm has a high complexity, making
it infeasible to use in its current form for this problem.
Instead, we used a single instance of the Recentred Lo-
cal Profiles algorithm [17] to compare the profiles of
each account.
The distance between all pairs of accounts was
calculated and the likelihood values were calculated
by comparing the distances to precomputed distances
from a training dataset containing known account
matches (see [14] for details). The distribution of the
precomputed distances is used to calculate these em-
pirical likelihoods, such that the likelihood of two ac-
counts being matches is given as the percentage of
pairs of accounts in the training dataset with a higher
distance.
Account matches with a likelihood above a given
threshold were considered to be matches. While ‘nor-
mal’ thresholds, such as 0.9 or 0.95, could be used,
we computed the optimal threshold using a training
dataset that maximises the F-measure (i.e. the har-
monic mean of precision and recall) and used that
value, which was 0.989. Using higher thresholds re-
sulted in lower recall values, while lower thresholds
gave lower precision values.
Regarding the entity-based temporal similarity, the
time of the experiment is divided into time frames Ti
of equal length δ t. Figure 2 presents the algorithm
for measuring the entity-based temporal similarity be-
tween two profiles u and v at a given time frame Ti.
Such similarity aims to identify profiles that act in co-
ordination. The underlying assumption is that social
campaigns that have a common goal should, at a given
time frame, exhibit a minimum of similarity. The fol-
lowing three types of entities in Twitter are considered:
6references (e.g. @screenname), hashtags (e.g. #hash-
tags) and URLs. For a given pair of profiles similar
references can reveal that the targeted individuals are
identical, sharing same hashtags can reveal a common
approach to catch the attention of users and using same
malicious URL can reveal the use of the same strategy.
Inputs:
(u,v) a couple of Twitter profiles
E(u) the set of entities published by a profile u
tue the publication time of entity e by profile u
Output:
BT (u,v) the vector containing
the similarity scores BTi(u,v) of each time step i
1 BT (u,v)← /0
2 foreach e ∈ E(u)∩E(v)
3 foreach Ti ∈ [0,T ]
4 if tue ∈
[
Ti− dt2 ,Ti+ dt2
]
or tve ∈
[
Ti− dt2 ,Ti+ dt2
]
5
BTi(u,v) = BTi(u,v)+ log(
|M|
|{m j :e∈m j}| )∗ e
− |tue−tve |t
6 endif
7 end foreach
8 end foreach
9 return BT (u,v)
Fig. 2. Algorithm for measuring the entity-based temporal similarity
of profiles
The input of the algorithm is a couple of suspi-
cious profiles denoted (u,v) and the output is a vec-
tor BT (u,v) = (BT1(u,v),BT2(u,v), ...) where BTi(u,v)
is the temporal similarity at time step Ti. The temporal
similarity vector is initialised at line 1. A loop is per-
formed on each entity e that has been published by both
profiles u and v (line 2). The moment of publication of
such entities is investigated to identify the correspond-
ing time step (lines 3 and 4). When the entity is iden-
tified as belonging to the current time frame, the sim-
ilarity score is increased by a score such as indicated
in line 5. The first component of the score is calculated
based on the Inverse Document Frequency (IDF) fea-
ture [23]. In our case, a document refers to a message
and a term corresponds to an entity e. m j refers to the
set of tweets that contain the entity and M is the num-
ber of tweets concerned in the experiment.
The second component of the score is a measure of
the synchronization observed between the common en-
tities that are published. The measure of the synchro-
nization rests on an exponential decay. The mean life-
time t, allows the similarity score to decrease more or
less rapidly, as the synchronization delta (|tue − tve |) is
important. Setting t to an important value will enable
the detection of strongly synchronised publication of
profiles. Conversely, a small value will enable the de-
tection of similar profiles even if they are not strictly
simultaneous.
This entity-based temporal similarity score is com-
bined with the result of the authorship attribution to
provide a unique content-based similarity between a
given pair of profiles. This global similarity is identi-
fied as the strength of a tie between profiles. We pro-
pose to define the strength wTi(u,v) between a profile
u and a profile v during a time step Ti as stated in equa-
tion 2.
wTi(u,v) = aA(u,v)+bBTi(u,v) (2)
Where:
A(u,v) refers to the result of the authorship attribu-
tion between u and v
BTi(u,v) refers to the entity based temporal similarity
between u and v
Note that we do not perform the authorship attri-
bution dynamically. One reason is that the number of
messages required to perform such analysis and ob-
tain good performance is relatively important (approx-
imately 200 tweets). In our case, this is made possi-
ble by collecting the last 200 tweets of each suspicious
profile with the Twitter search API. However, we can-
not ensure that a sufficient amount of messages is pub-
lished at each time step for applying authorship attri-
bution dynamically. The complexity of the algorithm is
another reason for this choice. The alpha and beta co-
efficients must be adapted to the constraints of the ex-
periment (time-response, number of messages, number
of profiles, etc.).
Suspicious campaign detection
In the third step, we aim to reveal suspicious profiles
that share significant similarities. For this purpose, we
propose to build a suspicious graph denoted G(N,E)
that is composed by a set of nodes N (i.e. suspicious
profiles) and a set of edges E (i.e. relationships). The
weight on an edge between two profiles u and v is mea-
sured as the sum, over the time of the experiment, of
the weights wTi(u,v).
We apply a threshold to remove non-significant
edges from the suspicious graph and then perform a
7modularity-based clustering algorithm to this graph to
detect suspicious campaigns [19]. The modularity of
a graph is a measure of the strength of a particular
division of a network into communities [20]. Mod-
ularity is high when a partition obtains many edges
within communities and only a few between them. The
modularity-based algorithm uses a greedy optimiza-
tion to find partitions of the graphs that have a high
modularity. It starts by considering each node as a
community and successively merges communities that
generate the highest increase in the modularity score.
The clusters are characterised both by content-based
and behaviour-based attributes in the aim to clearly
identify their purpose. The characterization applied to
clusters has a double aim; first it enables better under-
standing of the strategies used by malicious actors and,
second, it can enable identification of potential unde-
tected profiles that belong to these clusters by applying
features such as the affinity to cluster.
Results
We tested our methodology on a set of profiles
that produced an important number of messages that
were published in the public timeline of Twitter dur-
ing the time of the experiment (from 01/03/2012 to
10/04/2012). For this experiment, the threshold pa-
rameter K was set to 20 messages (such a threshold
enables identification of only very active profiles). A
set of 1,000 suspicious profiles identified by the mod-
ule I was selected for deeper investigation. The sus-
picious profile classification finally obtained an accu-
racy of 81% with a precision equals to 96% and a
recall equals to 82%. Figure 3 represents the suspi-
cious graph G(N  E) which contains the connections
between profiles with regard to their similarity (param-
eters alpha and beta was set to equal weights). Graphs
are displayed using Gephi software [5].
In sub-figure (a) the graph contains all the connec-
tions identified during the experiment. The number of
nodes equals 680, that is approximately 70% of the
suspicious individuals analysed. This first observation
indicates that less than 30% of suspicious profiles from
our dataset appear to behave completely independently
of any kind of campaign. The measured clustering co-
efficient is equal to 0.505, the modularity is equal to
0.681 and the average path length is equal to 2.87. In
sub-figure (b) we have highlighted the main clusters by
deleting non-significant connections (edges with a low
weight).
Fig. 3. Suspicious graph that contains detected campaigns
We present below the results of the behavioural char-
acterization for the three major campaigns identified.
Figure 4 illustrates the number of nodes belonging to
each of the three main clusters during the time of the
experiment.
Cluster 1 has approximately 100 participants with a
maximum number of 140 at day 20. Cluster 2 has a
relatively stable number of participants of 40. Cluster
3 has a decreasing number of participants: 140 at day
one and only 25 at day 20. The first observations show
that the suspicious networks are dynamic and evolve
significantly over time. A decrease in the size of a net-
work can be explained by various factors such as the
deletion of malicious profiles by Twitter. It is also plau-
sible that a malicious user managing a network at a
given time decides to stop the campaign, either tem-
porarily or permanently. Conversely, an increase of the
8Fig. 4. Number of profiles belonging to the clusters over time
number of participants in a suspicious network can be
explained by creation of new profiles, increasing the
number of suspicious profiles acting in coordination at
a given time.
We set forth in table 2 to 4 the behavioural charac-
teristics of the clusters obtained. For comparison pur-
pose, we have displayed in table 1 the average values
for the same characteristics over a large set of normal
profiles. We observe that among the most relevant pa-
rameters, the average number of hashtags (Avg #) used
in tweets is much higher for suspicious profiles than
for normal profiles. This observation confirms the fact
that a suspicious profile aims to gain in visibility by in-
cluding hashtags in its messages, as hashtags enable a
community of interest to receive tweets.
On the other hand, normal profiles use more refer-
ences (Avg @= 0 68) than suspicious profiles (Avg @=
0 30). Remember that tweets containing references
(e.g. @screenname) are automatically received by the
referenced person. The scores reveal that malicious
campaigns are not targeting particular individuals but
rather aim to reach larger communities identified by
hashtags. The average URL number per tweet is also
much higher for profiles belonging to suspicious com-
munities (Avg URL = 0 70) than for normal profiles
(Avg URL = 0 20). This reveals that these profiles act
on the platform mostly to increase the visibility of a
given set of websites.
The behavioural characteristics of suspicious clus-
ters indicate that there is no significant distinction be-
tween the three suspicious campaigns. To better char-
acterise them, we propose to investigate the quality of
the URLs that they have promoted.
Figures 5 to 7 illustrate the box plots of the scores
obtained for the set of URLs produced by each cam-
paign over a set of four indicators. On this plot the dots
represent the outliers of the data sample. The minimum
Table 1
Average features scores for normal profiles
Averages
Account age 513
Freq tweet 94.0
Avg # 0.18
Avg @ 0.68
Avg URL 0.20
Freq RT 0.16
#Friends 1049
#Followers 2836
#Tweets 110
Table 2
Behavioral characteristics of the spam campaign 1
Avg Min Max Med
Account age 668 312 1323 560
Freq tweet 106 0.11 429 91.9
Avg # 2.00 0.10 5.50 1.7
Avg @ 0.60 0.00 3.9 0.00
Avg URL 0.69 0.00 1.23 0.94
Freq RT 0.20 0.00 3.30 0.00
#Friends 5086 0.00 22127 3234
#Followers 6473 3.00 22680 4328
#Tweets 321 229 485 297
Table 3
Behavioral characteristics of the spam campaign 2
Avg Min Max Med
Account age 462 308 1363 365
Freq tweet 88.8 0.07 402 40.5
Avg # 2.03 0.33 6.53 1.61
Avg @ 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00
Avg URL 0.81 0.01 1.07 0.96
Freq RT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
#Friends 1349.1 0.00 9819 191
#Followers 1297 0.00 8949 460
#Tweets 268 232 314 268
9Table 4
Behavioral characteristics of the spam campaign 3
Avg Min Max Med
Age account 615 322 989 575
Freq tweet 139 11.0 370 87.2
Avg # 2.01 1.01 3.48 1.78
Avg @ 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.01
Avg URL 0.81 0.43 1.00 0.9
Freq RT 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01
#Friends 999 6.00 2210 890
#Followers 1404 155 2882 1289
#Tweets 293 237 381 278
and maximum (excluding outliers) are represented by
the lower and upper horizontal lines. The bounds of the
main rectangle are defined by the values of the lower
and upper quartiles. The median is displayed as a bold
line.
This evaluation has been performed based on the
Web Of Trust (WOT) API that uses a crowdsourc-
ing approach to evaluate the quality of a website [1].
The four criteria are 1) trustworthiness 2) reliability,
3) privacy and 4) child safety. Trustworthiness refers
to the global trust that one gives to the website (ser-
vice, safety, etc.). Reliability (vendor reliability) refers
to trust that one gives to the website for performing
business transactions (e.g. buying, selling, etc.). Pri-
vacy refers to the trust regarding handling of personal
information. Finally, child safety refers to the existence
of age-inappropriate material on the site. Each crite-
rion is given a score between 0 and 100 that reect the
trust of the website and that should be interpreted as
follows: > 80 Excellent; > 60 Good; > 40 Unsatisfac-
tory; > 20 Poor; > 0 Very poor.
The results highlight that clusters one, two and three
seem to quote trustworthy websites overall. However,
a few anomalies for clusters two and three reveal the
fact that some of the websites have a very poor score
regarding child safety. Cluster one reveals a signifi-
cant set of abnormal websites with very poor charac-
teristics. It is observed that a set of quoted websites is
not completely trusted for any criterion analysed. This
clearly highlights the fact that a set of websites is mali-
cious and that the campaign has malicious (e.g. phish-
ing) intent.
Fig. 5. Characterisation of URLs produced by spam campaign 1
Fig. 6. Characterisation of URLs produced by spam campaign 2
Fig. 7. Characterisation of URLs produced by spam campaign 3
Performances
We measure the performance of our approach with
Purity, Inverse Purity and F measures [25]. These mea-
sures aim to evaluate the differences between the test
data sample (i.e. profiles with verified labels) denoted
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L with the obtained data sample (i.e. profiles with la-
bels issued from the algorithm) denoted C.
Given a set of manually labelled spam campaigns
L = L1, ...,Lm and a set of detected campaigns C =
C1, ...,Ck, the purity of a clustering approach is defined
as follows:
Purity =
k
å
i=1
|Ci|
k
max
j∈1,...,m
Precision(Ci,L j) (3)
Where the precision of a detected campaign Ci, for
a given category L j is defined as follows:
Precision(Ci,L j) =
k
å
i=1
∣∣Ci∩L j∣∣
|Ci| (4)
The basic relationship between precision and recall
is obtained by the following formula:
Recall(Ci,L j) = Precision(Li,C j) (5)
The inverse purity is defined by:
Inverse Purity =
m
å
i=1
|Li|
n
max
j∈1,...,k
Recall(C j,Li) (6)
Note that for each detected campaign, the precision
is evaluated by identifying the labelled campaign that
shares the highest number of common profiles. Sim-
ilarly, the recall of a labelled campaign is calculated
based on the detected campaign that contains the high-
est number of common profiles.
Finally, the performances are evaluated with the F-
measure, which is defined in equation 7.
F =
m
å
i=1
|Li|
n
max
j∈1,...,k
F(Li,C j) (7)
Where:
F(Li,C j)=
2∗Recall(Li,C j)∗Precision(Li,C j)
Recall(Li,C j)+Precision(Li,C j)
(8)
Figure 8 presents the precision and recall obtained
for the three main campaigns detected in our data sam-
ple. We obtained a purity equal to 0.81 and an inverse
purity equal to 0.74. The final F-measure obtained is
equal to 0.76.
Note that these scores are calculated based on the
full time of the experiment. The dynamic aspect of the
campaign can generate variation of the results that de-
pends on the selected time-frame.
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Precision 0.79 0.74 0.81
Recall 0.98 0.67 0.74
Fig. 8. Precision and recall for the three main campaigns of the data
sample.
Discovered Campaigns
We have evaluated the reputation related to an aver-
age benign profile such as the one of a profile belong-
ing to detected campaigns. The reputation of a Twit-
ter profile denoted u represented by a node in the so-
cial graph is defined in equation 9 as proposed by [26].
This value is equal to the number of followers divided
by the number of friends and followers. This measure
allows to calculate the level of attractiveness of a pro-
file (captured by the number of incoming connections)
moderated by its own proportion to create connections.
R(u) =
din(u)
din(u)+dout(u)
(9)
Based on our results, a given benign profile has an
overall reputation of 0.73 which reveals the fact that
it attracts a number of followers that is roughly equals
to double the number of their friends. Remember that
the values of average number of friends and followers
are relatively high because of the selection process of
SPOT, that only analyses the most active profiles of the
Twitter platform.
The three campaigns possess an average reputation
of 0.56, 0.49 and 0.58 respectively for campaign I, II
and III. Although theses scores are lower than for a be-
nign profile these are however relatively high. These
scores highlight the fact that surprisingly the malicious
campaigns do succeed to attract a quantity of follow-
ers that is higher or at least as important as their num-
ber of friends. This observation may rise from three
different reasons : (1) the organisation of profiles into
campaigns allows to artificially increase the reputation
by connecting together (this is known as link farming)
[12], (2) many profiles may find into malicious profiles
an opportunity to increase their audience and reputa-
tion (they usually follow people that follow them), (3)
they fully exploit hashtags or references in the aim to
increase their reputation. It is important to note that,
as the reputation of malicious campaign increases, the
number of vulnerable profiles also increases.
Over the three campaign, campaign number II ex-
hibits the lowest score of reputation. A possible reason
is its lower number of participants (about 40 profiles).
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This makes the artificial increase of reputation less ef-
ficient than for campaign I and II that owns a higher
number of profiles (respectively 100 and 140). Also
campaign II has a lower average number of tweets,
retweets and references. These three factors may also
be taken into account as a result of this lower reputa-
tion score.
We have manually investigated the three identified
campaigns and have highlighted a set of techniques
that they apply in order to reach their goal. We present
below the four main identified techniques and present
in table 5 the level of usage of these techniques by the
three main campaigns.
(1) The use of hashtags that encourage users to fol-
low profiles of a campaign (denoted EF for encour-
age followers). Among the most commonly used hash-
tags for these purpose, we have identified : #500aday,
#1000ADAY, #f4f, #Follow4Follow, #followme, #In-
stantFollow, #MustFollow, #OpenFollow, #OpenFol-
lowPro, #TeamAutoFollow, #TeamFollowBack.
(2) The use of words and hashtags that encourage
readers to download, view a media or visit a given web-
page (denoted ED for encourage downloads). Among
the most common words and hashtags, we can quote :
#Download, #freedownload, #freedownloads.
(3) The use of pseudo-automatic tweets (denoted PA
for pseudo-automatic). Such tweets have a common
root and only a few words, numbers or punctuation
marks are modified from tweets to tweets. Usually, the
dynamic part is either the final characters, the refer-
ences or hashtags used in the tweets. Note that, entirely
similar tweets cannot be sent on the Twitter platform
by the same profile.
(4) The use of external media or tools to feed the
tweets (denoted EM for external media). Some pro-
files send every period of time a tweet that is extracted
from a RSS feeds but also some sentences fetched from
books. Note that for this purpose, some social media
management tools such as TweetAdder, Twitterfeed,
HootSuite may be used.
We evaluated each technique for each campaign on
a three level scale : (’++’) for an extensive usage, (’+’)
for a usage and (’ ’) for a non usage.
The results provided in Table 5 indicates that cam-
paign 3, that has the higher reputation score has an ex-
tensive use of hashtags for encouraging followers. In
fact, we have observed that most of their tweets only
contains hashtags that refer to the follower/following
processes. A representation of the most common words
and hashtags are represented in figure 9.
Campaign I, as already shown in the previous sec-
tion contributes to the propagation of many malicious
Table 5
Techniques used by the different campaigns
EF ED PA EM
Campaign 1 + ++ +
Campaign 2 ++
Campaign 3 ++
Fig. 9. Cloud of the top words produced by spam campaign III
URLs. This observation is confirmed by the results
provided in table 5 and figure 10 that highlight the fact
that the tweets published by this campaign strongly en-
courage users to download or visit a given webpage.
Note that, such campaign also uses pseudo-automatic
messages such as hashtags that encourage followers.
These observations may explain the fact that despite
the malicious propagation of URLs, this campaign has
a quite high level of reputation.
Fig. 10. Cloud of the top words produced by spam campaign I
Finally, we have observe that the campaign II only
remains on the use of external feed. This means that it
catches parts of existing books or websites to publish
tweets. Such campaign does not encourage followers
nor downloading but however provides from time to
time URLs that represent a threat for users.
Discussion
There are no silver bullet approaches to security or
attack analysis, and therefore any methodology that
solves a problem in this space must be considered in
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the broader context of the global problem. Given this,
the main limitation of the provided approach is that it
discovers malicious campaigns on social media web-
sites, but does not necessarily discovery all such cam-
paigns. This limitation occurs for two reasons. Firstly,
malicious campaigns by their nature disobey normal
rules around how platforms are used. This means that
discovering patterns of usage are likely to have a high
precision by low recall, as different attacks work in
different ways. Second, it is often forgotten that the
actors behind these attacks are often intelligent, moti-
vated and persistent. Attackers often keep up to date
with technological advances and patterns of analysis,
and can alter their attack to circumvent new protec-
tion measures. This ‘cat and mouse game’ has been an
ongoing trait of security research and practice and is
likely to continue to be [7].
The results of the previous section do highlight that
our method does provide a high recall value for the
discovered clusters. These clusters represent approxi-
mately 70% of the overall set of malicious profiles, and
therefore we can approximate the lower bound of the
overall recall value at 0.55, which is the recall of the
known clusters as a proportion of the overall popula-
tion. This recall value indicates a significantly reduced
workload for an analyst needing to examine new trends
of attacks on social media websites.
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a novel approach
to detecting relationships between suspicious profiles
on social networking sites. Our approach is mainly
based on a combination of behavioural and content-
based algorithms. As a first step, the suspicious pro-
files are identified based on a support vector machine
algorithm applied to synthesised behavioural features
of the profiles. The similarity between the detected sus-
picious profiles is performed with content-based anal-
yses. This similarity is measured by applying author-
ship attribution to the messages published by the sus-
picious profiles. Additionally, we measure a temporal
similarity based on the identification of suspicious pro-
files that send messages simultaneously with the same
entities. We build a suspicious graph from the similar-
ity measure and perform a clustering algorithm to iden-
tify suspicious campaign. Malicious campaigns detec-
tion problem, as discussed in this work, can be used as
an entry point to assess the exposure of users to threats
and thus provide counter-measures.
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